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ABSTRACT

In the development of complex systems, such as user-centric privacy management
systems with multiple components and attributes, it is important to formalize the
process and develop mathematical models that can be utilized to automatically make
decisions on the information sharing actions of users. While valuable, the current
state-of-the-art models are mostly based on enterprise/organizational privacy perspectives and leave the main actor, i.e., the user, uninvolved or with limited ability
to control information sharing actions. These approaches cannot be applied to a
user-centric environment since user privacy policies are dynamic because they change
based on the information sharing context and environment. In this thesis, we focused
on developing the main core of the framework which is the privacy formalization and
verification engine that allows for the guided and flexible specification of users privacy
policies. The formalization and verification engine reasons about the users privacy
rules to find privacy violating information sharing actions and ensure that the privacy
norms are unambiguous and consistent. Utilizing these privacy norms the framework
monitors users information sharing actions to detect privacy violations. In cases that
an action is not compliant with the privacy norms, the framework utilizes a game
theoretic approach to generate a privacy decision model. This model enables the
users to proceed with the violating action without compromising their privacy by
suggesting an information negotiation protocol based on the information sensitivity,
users trust, and the reward of information sharing action.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A Privacy Bill of Rights was endorsed by the White House in 2012, a response to
an increasingly loud objection of citizens to the lack of privacy and fair information
practices guidelines [26]. The predicament was not only recognized by the US government, but also has been investigated and studied at the international stage and
has resulted in reports such as ”Rethinking personal data: Strengthening trust” by
the World Economic Forum (WEF) [50] and ”Recommendations for businesses and
policymakers” by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) [16]. Despite all these efforts,
ubiquitous online monitoring of users’ activities [36] and scandalous data breaches,
e.g. Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, continue to haunt Online Social Network
(OSN) users [2, 15]. These privacy breaches are often due to lack of regulatory
standardization, thus, delegating it to users to manage what information should
be shared with whom and when. However, keeping track of this vast amount of
information sharing can be an overwhelming task [57]. Therefore, ample tools and
algorithms should be developed and provided to users to define and enforce their own
customized, unambiguous privacy policies and have control over how their information
is shared. The state-of-the-art research on privacy management mostly consists of:
access control languages [4, 41, 49], different privacy settings in applications, and
formal privacy policies [5, 14, 19, 45]. While valuable, the previous works are mostly
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based on enterprise/organizational privacy management and leave the main actor, i.e.,
the user, uninvolved or with limited ability to control information sharing actions. In
addition, uniform privacy regulations like HIPAA or a corporation’s privacy policies
are domain-specific and static with a little or no change over time. However, the user’s
privacy policies are dynamic and change based on the information sharing context
and environment. In addition to dynamicity, the privacy framework should provide
the user with customizable policies since the definition of privacy varies from user to
user based on their personality, cultural background, etc.
The proposed framework is considered as the first step toward our efforts to build
a user-centric privacy management system. In this paper, we focus on developing the
main core which is the privacy formalization and verification engine that allows for
the guided and flexible specification of users’ privacy intentions. The formalization
and verification engine performs formal reasoning about the user’s privacy rules to find
privacy violations and ensure that the privacy policy is unambiguous and consistent.
The underlying formalization utilizes two formal models, the user’s behavior model,
and the privacy-preserving behavior model. The user’s behavior model represents all
the user’s information transfers. The privacy verification is performed by mapping
each user’s behavior state to a state in the privacy-preserving model; a state with no
mapping indicates a privacy violation. As a proof of concept, the privacy formalization
and verification engine is implemented as a Java program

1

that detects privacy

violations as the user shares information in real-time. Since this framework is targeted
for smart devices, which usually have low memory and low processing power, its
performance was evaluated on both a PC and a Raspberry Pi model B to show the
practicality of our approach.
1

https://github.com/wxyzabc/UserCentricPrivacy
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The future work will extend the current effort to include other layers, i.e. user
privacy requirement elicitation, identifying and categorizing information shared by
users, and establishing the relationship between a user and recipients.

1.1

Thesis Statement

• Design and Implementation of a users-centric privacy formalization and verification engine that specifies the privacy norms from the user’s perspective.
• Describing run-time approaches in the privacy framework to detect privacy
disclosure events and inconsistent privacy norms.
• Upon creation of privacy verification framework, suggesting a privacy negotiation protocol that enables users to negotiate private data with the third party
services.
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CHAPTER 2

RELATED WORKS

For over 120 years researchers have been studying privacy in different settings of
technological advances [53, 58]. The first privacy theory emerged when newspapers
started to publish personally intrusive articles and photographs [53]. This led to
seclusion and non-intrusion theory of privacy that defined the user’s privacy as “the
right to be left alone” [58] or being free from intrusion [23]. As new technologies were
introduced such as databases containing the personal information of the users [53]
the information-related privacy concerns [47] emerged. To address these concerns
researchers developed the control [59], limitation [21], and Restricted Access/Limited
Control (RACL) [40] theories to enable users to control and limit their privacy while
sharing information with others. In RACL theory, the user’s privacy is implied as
“a situation with regard to others [if] in that situation the individual. . . is protected
from intrusion, interference, and information access by others.” [54] The control,
limitation and RACL theories assume a rigid definition of privacy, while in the
current technological era the meaning of privacy changes based on the societal norms.
To address this issue, Nissenbaum proposed the Contextual Integrity (CI) theory of
privacy, [43] where privacy behaviors are affected by the context of the information
sharing environment.
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To implement the above theories, privacy policy languages were created based
on the theories of limitation, control and RACL. The early privacy languages were
either created by augmentation of access control languages or had the same structure
of specifying policies as a set of access roles and information categories in a structured format like Extensible Markup Language (XML). Some well-known examples of
such Languages are Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [49], Enterprise
Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [4], eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) [41], and Confab [25]. The early version of these languages
lacked temporal modalities that were solved in the extended versions of them such as
adding spatio-temporal attributes to XACML [33, 44, 55].
Another common formalism for privacy is based on transition systems where
the policies are specified as action and state of information sharing. Formalizing
privacy policies were based on the privacy-preserving and privacy-violating actions
in the system. Also, in this formalism, the temporal characteristic of privacy was
modeled using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). Lu et al.

[35] proposed a technique

that translated the privacy specification of web services to LTL formulas. Then a Privacy Interface Automata (PIA) was presented to transform the messaging structure
extracted from the web service business process execution language (WS-BPEL) into
an automaton, creating their privacy policy model. Krishnan et al. [32] also proposed
an approach to enforce privacy requirements using role-based access control and
LTL. The authors base their technique on behavior automata that model the system
behavior (gathering or using data) and access control automata, which enforce the
privacy policies. Kouzapas et al. [31], combined the π-calculus and privacy calculus
to verify privacy policies formally. Their framework has a type system to capture
privacy related notations and a language for expressing the privacy policies. Grace
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and Surridge [22] proposed a model of user-centric privacy with a labeled transition
system, which compares the cloud service privacy policies with the users’ privacy
preferences. However, while they provide customizable privacy preferences, they do
not consider environmental variables in their model. Although this group specifies
the privacy utilizing a formal semantic and considers the temporal modalities, the
action based modeling of the system is not scalable [5].
The scalability issue in action based systems were addressed by Aucher et al. [5]
that proposed to specify the privacy policies over the knowledge that the information
sharing action exposes to the recipients of the information. In this model, privacy
policy is specified as allowed and prohibited knowledge rather than actions, and
different actions can result in different knowledge exchange. They used dynamic
epistemic deontic logic (DEDL) as the foundation of their language. The authors
define information sharing conditions as permitted or forbidden knowledge and the
proposed language does not support temporal modalities. Also, Pardo et al.

[45],

presented a formal language for privacy policy, using epistemic logic for social network
models. However, their formal privacy policy did not contain time features; later,
[30, 46] extended [45] to include time characteristics to the privacy language by
adding time interval and LTL which led to the creation of timed privacy frameworks
for social media. Both frameworks used a social network model and privacy policies
as properties for model checking [8] verification.
While the variety of implementations based on the theory of limitation, control
and RACL continues to grow, with the advent of CI, Barth et al. [9] have proposed
the formalization of CI theory of privacy. The authors have utilized first-order logic
and LTL to model the transfer of knowledge between agents during the information
sharing activities that are governed by Nissenbaum’s concept of norms. In this

7
context, a positive norm is defined as a permission that allows information sharing
activity and a negative norm prevents the information sharing activity. Further,
implementation of CI was extended by DeYoung et al . [19] to include the notion of
purpose and self-reference based on their Privacy Least Fixed Point (LFP) framework.
The proposed framework resulted in the broader formalization of HIPAA and GLBA
privacy laws.
The above approaches assume that the privacy policies will be created in a manner
that are consistent with one another. However, user privacy is dynamic in nature and
as relationships and user’s requirements changes so should the privacy norms. These
changes can result in privacy policy conflicts. Therefore, Breaux et al. [14] proposed
Eddy that utilized CI. The goal of their research was to find privacy conflicts in
multi-stakeholder privacy policies. In order to achieve that goal, natural language
policies are translated to Description Logic (DL) [6] so it can be used in the formal
reasoning process to investigate whether the policies are consistent. Eddy and many
other frameworks that are based on CI theory are designed and developed based on
the organizational privacy requirements which are not compatible with individual
users privacy requirements. Table 2.1 summarizes the formal privacy studies that are
related to this research.

2.1

Privacy Policy Negotiation Protocol

Compared to the existing negotiation methods [29,48,52] that heavily involve users in
decision making or compromise user’s privacy for reaching an agreement on sharing
information, in the proposed method the user does not need to change the privacy
settings to share information that might be disclosing and the user is able to share
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Table 2.1: Relate works in formal privacy policies
Paper
[45]

Formalism used
Epistemic logic

Privacy Policy Domain
Social Networks

Evaluation Method
Model Checking

[30]

Epistemic logic,
LTL
π-calculus, Privacy calculus

Social Networks

Model Checking

Legal definition
of
privacyEnterprise

Model Checking

[22]

Labeled Transition System

Cloud Services

Model-driven
analysis over all
transitions

[5]

dynamic
epistemic
deontic
logic
(DEDL)
least fix point
logic (LFP)
description logic
(DL)

Enterprise- Web
services

Model Checking

Enterprise

Model Checking

HIPAA-GLBA

Enterprise multi
stakeholder privacy policies
Web services

Logical conflict
detection
algorithm
Model Checking
(SPIN)
Model Checking
(SAL symbolic
model checker)
Security
Monitors

FacebookZyngaAOL
Advertising
Online shopping
scenario
Authors privacy
scenarios

Security
Monitors

-

Security
Monitors

-

[31]

[19]
[14]

[35]
[32]

LTL,interface
automata
Role base access
control and LTL

[41]

XML

[4]

XML

[49]

XML

Enterprise

Access control
at the enterprise
level
Access control
at the enterprise
level
Internet
users
and websites

Evaluated Policy
Facebook, Twitter
Facebook, Twitter
Electronic
traffic pricing,
Speed-limit
enforcement
OPERANDO
project
trials-Health
care area
Authors
example of a
website policy

-

9
such information in a secure non disclosing manner. To make this goal happen we
need to use secure multi-party protocol as part of our privacy negotiation. The
secure multi-party protocols were designed as a solution to the problem of comparing
different values without revealing the values. The major methods in this area are:

Garbled Circuit (GC) This function representation was used in the first multiparty protocol, by Yao

[62, 63].

Yao introduces the multi-party protocol as a

solution to the millionaire problem in which there are two millionaire that want to
know who is the richest among them without disclosing the amount of their wealth.
As a solution, both parties inputs are given to a Garbled circuit that represents
computation function method, and the result of the circuit based on the inputs is the
answer to the comparison of the inputs.

Oblivious Transfer In oblivious transfer, the sender sends messages to the client
but doesn’t keep the order of the messages. Later Yao’s work was expanded by
Jakobsson and Yung [27] by defining the socialist millionaire problem in which the
two parties want to know if they have the same amount of wealth or not. Continuing
these studies different methods for secure multi-party computation was proposed. An
efficient way of oblivious transfer was proposed by Naor and Pinkas [42].

Homomorphic Encryption(HE) A form of encryption that is the result of a
specific type of computation on the encrypted data equals to the result of the data
as if the same computation was done on it and then the result was encrypted [56].

Set intersection Being able to share an integer privately enables us to share
datasets privately. Freedman et al.

[20] introduced multi-party computation of
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set intersection known as PSI-CA using homomorphic encryption and Hamming
Distance. Later [12, 13] built their framework upon PSI-CA as a cryptography
foundation and used Jacquard distance and Mini-hash to compute the similarity of
two sets and employ the PSI-CA as the protocol.
Development in this area resulted in creating generic tools that perform secure
multi-party protocols like TASTY [24], Fairplay [38], and VIFF [17]. Table 2.2
presents some detail on each tool. Tasty was developed after Fairplay and VIFF and
it contains the functionalities of both tools. In addition, FairplayML can be used as
a function language in Tasty.
Table 2.2: Comparison of 3 generic tools for secure multi-party protocol
Function Description

Protocol Implementation
Tool Language

TASTY
Boolean circuit,
secure
multi-party
computation
language, arithmetic circuit
based functions
GC, HE
Python

Fairplay
Boolean circuit, secure multi-party computation language
GC
Java

VIFF
arithmetic
circuit
based
functions
HE
Python

The mentioned mechanisms and libraries are not applicable to all information
types and comparisons. Also, they are computationally expensive which makes them
impractical solutions for every communication in a user-centric environment. Besides,
in order for users to be able to use such protocols both sides of the communication
have to implement and use the protocol which may not be the case with third party
services.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This research extends the concept of contextual integrity [9] to provide mathematical models and algorithms that enables the creation and management of privacy
norms for individual users. The extension includes the augmentation of environmental
variables, i.e. time. date, etc. as part of the privacy norms, while introducing an
abstraction and a partial relation over information attributes.
The proposed framework is based on two sets of formal models: 1- User’s Behavior
Model (UBM) that represents the information sharing activities in real-time, and 2Privacy-Preserving Model (PPM) that formally specifies the user’s privacy requirements. Finally, the privacy verification is performed by mapping each action in UBM
to its corresponding action in PPM and the actions without mapping are marked as
privacy-violating. The rest of this section explains the above concepts in details.

3.1

The User Behavior Model (UBM)

In this research, we draw from the formal definition of entities that construct Information Communication to model user’s information sharing behavior with the recipients,
which are defined as agents [5, 9]. Hence, P is defined as a set of agents that are the
recipient of the information sent from the user. For example, Alice and Bob are
agents that the user shares information with. In addition, T is a set of attributes
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that defines the information shared with p ∈ P such as “home address” or “credit
card number”.
From the above definitions, a knowledge state κ is defined as a set of tuples of
the form (p, {t1 , . . . , tk }), which describes the attributes ti ∈ T that is shared with an
agent p. For example (Alice, {home address, credit card number}) means that Alice
knows about the “home address” and “credit card number”. As a result, if agents
have no knowledge about the user then κ can be the empty set. Therefore, the absence
of tuples for p indicates that the agent p possesses no information about the user, i.e.,
the elements (p, ∅) ∈
/ κ. Thus, κ can be defined as follows where P is a set of agents
and P(T ) is the power set of attributes,

κ ⊆ ∅ ∪ (P × (P(T ) \ ∅))

For brevity we use e
t to represent an element of P(T ), i.e., {t1 , . . . , tk }.
In the proposed framework the user can perform two commands either to share or
to stop sharing information with an agent. Each share, sh, or stop sharing, st command results in a communication action which we define as a triple (a, p, e
t ), where a ∈
{sh, st}. For example, when a user intends to share his/her home address with Alice,
the following communication action has to be performed: (sh, Alice, {home address}).
Thus, all possible communication actions can be defined as

Act = {sh, st} × P × (P(T ) \ ∅)

Based on the entities defined so far, the user’s behavior model could be defined
by a transition system where each state represents the information shared with the
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agents. Further, each transition is triggered by the communication action performed
by the user.
Definition 1 ( The User Behavior Model (UBM) ) Let U BM = (K, Act, →
, κ0 ) be a 4-tuple transition system where:
• K is a finite set of knowledge states κ.
• κ0 ∈ K is the initial state κ0 = ∅ (no initial disclosures).
• Act is a set of communication actions.
• δ : K × Act 7→ K is a transition function, transform the system state with
actions (a, p, e
t ) as follows:
– δ(κ, (sh, p, e
t )) = κ0 , where κ0 = κ ∪ {(p, e
t )},
– δ(κ, (st, p, e
t )) = κ0 , where κ0 = κ \ {(p, e
t0 ) | e
t∩e
t0 6= ∅}.
It is important to note that the proposed model differentiates between the sequentially/simultaneously sharing of t1 and t2 with p. The sequential sharing results in
κ1 = {(p, {t1 }), (p, {t2 })} while the simultaneous sharing results in κ2 = {(p, {t1 , t2 })}.
In κ2 if the action (sh, p, {t1 , t2 }) occurs (p, {t1 , t2 }) is added to the new knowledge
set. Thus a state contains all three tuples κ3 = {(p, {t1 }), (p, {t2 }), (p, {t1 , t2 })}. On
the other hand, the performance of the stop command (st, p, t2 ) on κ3 will result in
deletion of all the information attributes that contained t2 resulting in κ0 = {(p, {t1 })}.
For the sequential information sharing model, we consider a scenario where a user
first shares his “GPS” information with Alice, second shares his “home address” with
her, and third shares his billing information which is a combination of {home address,
credit card number} with Alice. If the commutation action of stop sharing “home
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address” with Alice occurs then all the tuples that contain “home address” like billing
information will be removed from the state.

3.2

Privacy-Preserving Model (PPM)

The Privacy-Preserving Model is designed to manage user’s information sharing activities at run-time. Therefore, based on the proposed UBM in the previous section,
PPM model is required to govern the transitions between knowledge states according
to the norms that the user specifies.
Since in a user-centric approach it is inefficient to define a separate privacy norm for
each ρ (role) and τ (attribute type), the proposed model abstracts these two elements.
These abstractions allow to have the same information disclosure norms for a set of
agents or disclose a collection of attributes in a similar manner. For example, the
user could share her current location with all transportation applications, or the user
could share her credit and debit cards’ numbers with her close family members. The
following section describes the structure of the abstractions:

3.2.1

Abstractions and Conditions

Let T be a set of attribute types and let AT be a partial map AT : P(T ) * T . That
is, AT maps e
t to an attribute type τ ∈ T . We can impose a partial order  on τ
based on the subset relation between AT ’s domain elements e
t. We say that τ1  τ2 if
there are exist e
t1 and e
t2 such that AT (e
t1 ) = τ1 , AT (e
t2 ) = τ2 and e
t1 ⊆ e
t2 .
Figure 3.1, and 3.2 demonstrate an example of this hierarchy structure and some
attributes and attribute types in that structure. The dashed lines represent the
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mapping between attributes and their type and the solid lines depict the order relation
between the attribute and types.

Figure 3.1: An example of the partial order of the attributes and attribute types where
the top layer show the attribute types and the bottom layer show the information
themselves.

Figure 3.2: t1 =GPS information, t2 = home address, and t3 = credit card number.
The middle layer represents the information that are used together for example the
credit card number and the home address go together for billing information that is
a considered as financial type.
Similar to [9] that defines the concept of role abstraction, we define a set of agent
roles R that can be assigned to an agent p. An agent can be assigned to multiple roles
and roles are partially ordered based on their implication relation of their semantics.
In this framework, the partial order ≤ on R is predefined as an input to the model,
such that the role, ρ1 , “close friend” implies the role, ρ2 , “friend”, i.e., ρ2 ≤ ρ1 . The
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order between roles implies the amount of relative privacy restriction of them where
ρ2 ≤ ρ1 means that ρ2 is more restrictive compared to ρ1 .
In this approach each agent must be associated with at least one role. Thus, we
define the agent role as a function AR that maps an agent to a nonempty set of
roles: AR : P 7→ P(R) \ ∅. When role ρ is assigned to an agent p, then the system
adds additional roles that related to ρ through ≤. In other words, the set of roles
for p should be closed under ≤. For example, if the agent p is assigned the role
“close friend” ρ1 , then the system adds “friend” role ρ2 to p as well, resulting in
AR(p) = {ρ1 , ρ2 }.
For brevity to show the roles and information attributes that have a common child
but are not in a partial relation with each other we use the < child > notation as
follows:
1. ρ1 < p > ρ2 = ∃p ∈ P : ρ1 ∈ AR(p) ∧ ρ2 ∈ AR(p) ∧ ρ1 ρ2 ∧ ρ2 ρ1
2. τ1 < t > τ2 = ∃e
t ∈ P(T ) : AT (e
t)  τ1 ∧ AT (e
t)  τ2 ∧ τ1 τ2 ∧ τ2 τ1
Using these abstractions the user can define access permissions A as a subset of
R × T such that if an element (ρ, τ ) ∈ A then all agents with role ρ are allowed to
access attributes with type τ .
The above abstractions of roles and information attributes provide a better flexibility
in defining privacy norms. However, this definition is not complete yet, as it does
not take into consideration the environmental conditions where the information is
disclosed to the recipients and has no sensitivity over the patterns and sequence of
the information disclosure. Imagine, the user is interested in restricting access of
agents in ρ role to its attribute type τ to a particular time interval during a work
day. Moreover, the user might allow only up to two (ρ, τ ) accesses per such interval.
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In order to overcome this limitation, our formalism introduces the logic for environmental conditions ψ and temporal conditions ϕ to the definition of the privacy norm.
In this model, environmental conditions are represented a set of variables V , where
each v ∈ V describes the state of an environment such as system’s time, day and other
attributes. Then, V is partitioned into subsets Vi by variables’ type like integers,
boolean, reals and so on. It is assumed that each type has a set of predicates P redi
and set of syntax rules to construct such predicates from the variables and non-logical
symbols, e.g., constants. Then an environmental condition (ψ) is expressed as a
propositional logic over those predicates and variables, i.e., v ∈ Vi , predi ∈ P redi as
follows:

ψ ::= ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | predi , ∀Vi ∈ V

While P redi could be produced by an arbitrary complex yet decidable theory for
the data type such as Presburger arithmetic for integers, we argue that less complex
theories could be adequate [3]. For example, for integer environmental variables VI
and boolean VB environmental variables the following grammar could be sufficient to
express basic and easily comprehensible predicates predi :

predI ::= v ≤ n | v < n | v == n, v ∈ VI , n ∈ Z
predB ::= v | true | f alse, v ∈ VB

The next entity that is defined as part of the privacy norm is the temporal condition
ϕ. In order to keep the conditions flexible and generic, we utilize temporal logic
expressions to describe temporal features of the privacy requirements. While Linear
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Temporal Logic (LTL) is very popular in expressing broad range of liveness conditions,
they are difficult to read and understand. Utilizing LTL requires a strong mathematical background, and is cumbersome for an average system modeler to implement.
Further, to define temporal conditions in privacy norm, a simplified regular expression
will suffice, e.g the precedence of two communication actions or a constant occurrence
a communication action can be sufficiently expressed by the concatenation and Kleen
star operations over A (the alphabet):

ϕ, φ ::= (ρ, τ ) | ϕ · φ | ϕ∗ , (ρ, τ ) ∈ A

The Φ notation is used to represent a set of ϕ, in which each ϕ for a given role ρ, can
be expressed as a regular expression that allows sharing attributes of type τ2 after
the sharing of attributes of type τ2 as follows:
ϕ = A∗1 · ((ρ, τ1 ) · A∗1 · (ρ, τ2 ))∗ · A∗1

Here A1 = A \ {(ρ, τ1 ), (ρ, τ2 )} In addition, the repetition of an event up to a constant
k times could be expressed with the following formula, where the power operator
describes the number of times a regular expression should be repeated.

ϕ = A∗2 ((ρ, τ ) · A∗2 )k

where A2 = A \ {(ρ, τ )}.
Now that we have defined each element in the privacy norm, the next section describes
the formal specification of the privacy norm and techniques to ensure the consistency
of the privacy requirements.
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3.2.2

Norms and their Consistency

In this research, norms are the formal definition of user’s privacy requirements that
are used to govern user’s information sharing behavior. In order to minimize the
risk of unwanted information sharing, we assume that if an action is not explicitly
defined as part of the user’s privacy policies then it is forbidden. Therefore, the only
type of norms that the user defines are positive norms, i.e., allowed norms. In this
context norm is formulated as a relation between access permission, environmental,
and temporal conditions. Hence, norm is represented as a tuple ((ρ, τ ), ψ, ϕ, ), where
(ρ, τ ) ∈ A and ψ ∈ Ψ, ϕ ∈ Φ. The first element of the tuple represents the privacy
policy, while the second and the third elements of the tuple describe the conditions
under which the transfer of information should occur. The set of such is referred to
as a set of norms N .
The set N has the uniqueness property, that is, only one tuple with the given (ρ, τ )
values is allowed in the set. However, the uniqueness property is not sufficient to
ensure the consistency of the privacy norms due to the partial relations that exist
among the roles and attribute types. Thus, in order to utilize N for privacy management and detection of information disclosure, a consistency check is required. Table
3.1 demonstrates a detailed explanation with examples of the different possible cases
of role and attributes types that two norms can have during consistency checking.
The row headers show the roles and the column headers show the attribute types.
The cells in gray are the example of their above conditions.
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Table 3.1: The possible consistency cases based on the roles and information attribute
types relations and the constrains over the conditions that result in consistency.
The notations F r=Friends, BF r=Best Friends, CoW r=Co-Workers, F ml=Family,
Loc=Location, F in=Finance, Hlth=Health, and Bank=Banking information

A

ρ1 < ρ2

B

F r < BF r

C

ρ1 = ρ2

D

Fr = Fr

E

ρ1 < p > ρ 2

F

Fr Anna CoWr

G
H

ρ1 < none > ρ2
Fr, none, Fml

1
τ1 < τ2
Loc < F in
c2 ⇔ c1
L(s1 ) = L(s2 )
Share Loc with Fr
when c1 an s1, share
Fin with BFr when c2
and s2. Fin should be
guarded the same or
better, c1 =⇒ c2 ,
L(s2 ) ⊆ L(s1 ). BFr
can have less restrictive access, c2 =⇒
c1 , L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 )

2
τ2 < τ1
Loc < F in
c2 =⇒ c1
L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 )
Share Fin with Fr
when c1 and s1, share
Loc with BFr when c2
and s2. Fin should be
guarded the same or
better, c2 =⇒ c1 ,
L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 ). BFr
can have less restrictive access c2 =⇒ c1 ,
L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 )

c1 =⇒ c2
L(s2 ) ⊆ L(s1 )
Share Loc with Fr
when c1 and s1, share
Fin with Fr when c1
and s2. Fin should be
guarded the same or
better way c1 =⇒ c2 ,
L(s2 ) ⊆ L(s1 ). Fr
should have at least
the same access, c1 ⇔
c2 , L(s1 ) = L(s2 ).

c2 =⇒ c1
L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 )
Share Fin with Fr
when c1 and s1, share
Loc with Frien when
c2 and s1. Fin should
be guarded the same
or better way, c2 =⇒
c1 , L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 ). Fr
should have at least
the same access c1 ⇔
c2 , L(s1 ) = L(s2 )

c1 =⇒ c2
L(s2 ) ⊆ L(s1 )
Share Loc with Fr
when c1 and s1, share
Fin with CoWr when
c2 and s2, which have
Anna as a common
agent. Fin should be
guarded the same or
better way c1
=⇒
c2 , L(s2 ) ⊆ L(s1 ).
Fr and CoWrk should
have at least the same
access to Loc c1 ⇔ c2 ,
L(s2 ) = L(s1 ), since
they share an agent.
True
Since Fr and Fml
are incomparable then
those norms should always be consistent.

c2 =⇒ c1
L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 )
Share Fin with Fr
when c1 and s1, share
Loc with CoWrk
when c2 and s2, which
have Anna a common
agent.
Fin should
be guarded better
than Loc c2 =⇒ c1 ,
L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 ). Fr
and CoWrk should
have at least the same
access to Loc c2 ⇔ c1 ,
L(s1 ) = L(s2 ), since
they share an agent.
True
Since Fr and Fml
are incomparable then
those norms should always be consistent.

3
τ1 = τ2
Loc = Loc
c2 =⇒ c1
L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 )
Share Loc with Fr
when c1 and s1, sare
Loc with Bfr when
c2 and s2.
Loc
should be guarded at
least the same way,
c1 ⇔ c2 , L(s1 ) =
L(s2 ). BFr can have
less restrictive conditions, c2
=⇒ c1 ,
L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 )
False
There should be only
one rule for the same
role and attribute
type - the uniqueness
property

c2 ⇔ c1
L(s1 ) = L(s2 )
Share Loc with Fr
when c1 and s1, share
Loc with CoWrk,
when c1 and s2,
which have Anna as a
common agent. Loc
should be guarded the
same way c1 ⇔ c2 ,
L(s1 ) = L(s2 ). Fr and
Cowrk should have
the least the same
access to Loc, c1 ⇔ c2 ,
L(s1 ) = L(s2 ), since
they share an agent.
True
Since Fr and Fml
are incomparable then
those norms should always be consistent.

4
τ1 < e > τ2
F in < Loc > HLth
c2 =⇒ c1
L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 )
Share Fin with Fr and
Health with BFr (or
vice versa) which can
share Loc. Loc should
be guarded at least
the same way c1 ⇔ c2 ,
L(s1 ) = L(s2 ). BFr
can have less restrictive condition, c2 =⇒
c1 , L(s1 ) ⊆ L(s2 )
c2 ⇔ c1
L(s1 ) = L(s2 )
Share Fin with Fr
when c1 and s1, share
Health with Fr when
c2 and s2, which can
share the same attribute Loc.
Loc
should be guarded at
least the same way
c1 ⇔ c2 , L(s1 ) =
L(s2 ). Fr should have
the same access c1 ⇔
c2 , L(s1 ) = L(s2 )
c2 ⇔ c1
L(s1 ) = L(s2 )
Share Fin with Fr
when c1 and s1, share
Health with CoWrk
when c2 and s2, which
have Anna as a common agent.
Loc
should be guarded at
least the same way
c1 ⇔ c2 , L(s1 ) =
L(s2 ). Fr and CoWrk
should have the same
access to Loc c1 ⇔ c2 ,
L(s1 ) = L(s2 ), since
they share an agent.
True
Since Fr and Fml
are incomparable then
those norms should always be consistent.

5
τ1 < none > τ2
Loc < none > Bank
True
Since Loc and Bank
are incomparable then
those norms should always be consistent.

True
Since Loc and Bank
are incomparable then
those norms should always be consistent.

True
Since Loc and Bank
are incomparable then
those norms should always be consistent.

True
Since Fr and Fml
are incomparable then
those norms should always be consistent.
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Definition 2 (Trivial Consistent Norms ) Two norms n1 = ((ρ1 , τ1 ), ψ1 , ϕ1 )
and n2 = ((ρ2 , τ2 ), ψ2 , ϕ2 ) are consistent when one of the four consistency conditions
holds:

C1:

@p ∈ P : ρ1 ∈ AR(p) ∧ ρ2 ∈ AR(p), that is, the norms defined for the roles

with no common agents. (Table 3.1 row G)

C2:

@e
t ∈ P(T ) : AT (e
t)  τ1 ∧ AT (e
t)  τ2 , that is, norms are defined for attribute

types with no common information attribute.(Table 3.1 column 5)

Before defining the last two conditions of consistency, we propose some limitations
over the access permission and sequencing conditions of the privacy norms. Since
both of these elements are defined for a specific roles and attribute type parameters,
the first restriction is defined over the roles so that the same role should be used
in the access permission and the sequencing condition of a norm. In the absence of
this restriction, it is possible to create two norms that have a consistent sequencing
condition but inconsistent access permission or vice versa. In addition, this restriction
enforces a constant role across the regular expression of the sequencing condition that
reduces the regular expression’s complexity by eliminating the need for a homomorphic function over the roles. The second restriction is defined over the attribute
types, ∀τ ∈ ϕ τi τj

0 ≤ i, j ≤ n (An attribute type and its children are not

allowed to exist in the same regular expression). This restriction ensures that all the
communication actions are inspected not only for the super-type τ , that is explicitly
inferred from the communication action, but also for all the children of τ that will
be implicitly revealed by that communication action. Without this restriction, it is
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possible to create a regular expression that allows for sharing an attribute type and
its children consecutively while it is not taking into the account that the children are
shared more than once.
Further, the comparisons of the access permission component of the norms are conducted based on the partial relations that exists over the roles and attribute types. In
addition, the comparison between the environmental conditions is implemented based
on the Boolean algebra. To examine the sequencing conditions for consistency, we
need to compare the regular expressions. the comparison of two regular expressions is
not possible if they do not share the same alphabet. Therefore, we need to introduce
a mechanism that projects the language of one regular expression to the other one
and brings the regular expressions to a common alphabet.

Definition 3 ( Projection of the Language ) Let ϕ1 and ϕ2 have the following
symbols to be tracked:
ϕ1 = {(ρ, τ1 ), (ρ, τ2 ), . . . , (ρ, τk )}
ϕ2 = {(ρ0 , τ10 ), (ρ0 , τ20 ), . . . , (ρ0 , τn0 )}
We define ϕ
f1 = L↓ (ϕ1 )ϕ2 as the projection of ϕ1 on ϕ2 where L↓ receives a regular
expression and maps it to another one. The regular expression consistency checking
process is described in Algorithm 1.
The process of mapping is described Line 2 and 3 of Algorithm 1 for ϕ1 , ϕ1 which
calls a function described in Algorithm 3. To achieve a similar language to compare
ϕ1 , ϕ2 we traverse over each one. For each attribute type we check for its children or
another attribute type that has a common child in the other regular expression and
add the children or the common child to a set in a map. After traversing over all the
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Algorithm 1: Substituting attribute types to reach a same alphabet
Input: Two regular expressions in form of ϕ1 = {(ρ, τ1 ), (ρ, τ2 ), . . . , (ρ, τk )}
and ϕ2 = {(ρ0 , τ10 ), (ρ0 , τ20 ), . . . , (ρ0 , τn0 )}
Output: True if ϕ1 is consistent with ϕ2 and False otherwise
1 function regexConsistencyCheck(ϕ1 , ϕ2 )
2
map1=findReducedAlphabet(ϕ1 ,ϕ2 );
3
map2=findReducedAlphabet(ϕ2 ,ϕ1 );
4
ϕ
f1 =regexSubstitution(map1,ϕ1 ,k);
5
ϕ
f2 =regexSubstitution(map2,ϕ2 ,n);
6
if ρ > ρ0 then
7
if L(f
ϕ2 ) ⊆ L(f
ϕ1 ) then
8
return True;
9
else
10
return False;
11
else if ρ < ρ0 then
12
if L(f
ϕ1 ) ⊆ L(f
ϕ2 ) then
13
return True;
14
else
15
return False;
16
else if ρ1 ∩ ρ01 6= ∅ or ρ == ρ0 then
17
if L(f
ϕ1 ) == L(f
ϕ2 ) then
18
return True;
19
else
20
return False;
21
else
22
return True;
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Algorithm 2: Algorithm that create the same alphabet for two regular expressions
Input: Two regular expressions in form of ϕ1 = {(ρ, τ1 ), (ρ, τ2 ), . . . , (ρ, τk )}
and ϕ2 = {(ρ0 , τ10 ), (ρ0 , τ20 ), . . . , (ρ0 , τn0 )}
Output: A map of the ϕ1 children that exist in ϕ2
1 function findReducedAlphabet(ϕ1 , ϕ2 )
2
forall τi ∈ ϕ1 do
3
map1={};// A map that hold the attribute types and it
possible substitutions
4
forall τj0 ∈ ϕ2 do
5
if τj0 .isChildOf(τi ) then
6
map1.add(τi , τj0 ); // add τj0 to the set of possible
mappings for τi
7
else if hasCommonChild(τi , τi0 ) then
8
map1.add(τi , getCommonChildren(τi , τj0 ))
9
return map1

Algorithm 3: Substitution algorithms for a regular expression that reduces the
language based on the mapping of the uncommon alphabet.
Input: A regular expression ϕ,map of substitutions and the |ϕ|
Output: The substituted regular expressions ϕ
e
1 function regexSubstitution(map, ϕ, size)
2
for i from 1 to size do
3
if !map.get(τi ).isEmpty() then
4
psb=allPossibleSubs(map1.get(τi ));
5
ϕ
f1 =ϕ1 .subForRegex(τi ,psb);
6
return ϕ;
e
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attribute types in both ϕ1 , ϕ2 the roles in them decide the consistency of two regular
expression.
In line 4 and 5 of Algorithm 1 calls a function from Algorithm 3 to substitute the
uncommon parts of the regular expressions by the common alphabet retrieved form
Algorithm 2. In Algorithm 3 the function “allPossibleSubs” generate all the possible
substitution for attribute type τi . The substitution for τi for reaching a common
language is a disjunctive regular expression. The disjunctive regular expression is
generated as follows. Let sub be a set of all τi children and common children that
f = P(sub) \ ∅. For
has been found in the other regular expression. We define sub
f we generate all the permutations of elements of s and add them to
each s ∈ sub
the regular expression with disjunction operator. For example, sub = {τa , τb } then
f = {{τa }, {τa }, {τa , τb }} and the result of the regular expression that is used for
sub
substitution is τa |τb |τa τb |τb τa . After reaching a same alphabet the consistency of the
regular expressions can be decides based on their roles.

C3:

ρ1 < ρ2 and either τ1  τ2 or τ2  τ1 then ψ1 =⇒ ψ2 ∧ L↓ (ϕ1 )ϕ2 ⊆ L↓ (ϕ2 )ϕ1 ,

that is, n2 is for a specialized role ρ2 of ρ1 and its attribute type τ2 encompasses τ1 or
vise verse then environmental condition of ψ2 should be the same or less restrictive
than of ψ1 and its regular expression ϕ2 should describe the same or less restricted
projected language than of ϕ1 .(Table 3.1 row A,C and columns 1,2,3)

C4:

ρ1 < p > ρ2 or τ1 < t > τ2 then ψ1 ⇔ ψ2 ∧ L↓ (ϕ1 )ϕ2 = L↓ (ϕ2 )ϕ1 .

If there is at least one agent that can be assigned to both unrelated roles or an
information attribute that share a common child then the environmental conditions
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and the projected language of the regular expressions must be equivalent.(Table 3.1
row E and columns 4)
3.2.3

Policy Compliance Verification

The set of norm N defines a Privacy-Preserving Model, (PBM) which describes
compliant information communication actions at the level of attribute type and agent
role abstraction levels. The knowledge states of PBM are consists of tuples (ρ, τ ),
which indicate that at least one agent with ρ role know about attribute represented
d from
by τ . The transitions represent the abstracted communication actions Act
{sh, st} × R × T guarded by conditions Φ and Ψ defined in N .
Definition 4 ( Privacy-Preserving Model) is a set of observers over norms N
d c, m) representing ni = ((ρ, τ ), ψ, ϕ) ∈ N
where each observer is a tuple of (K̂, Act,
where K̂ = {P(A)}, c = ψ is the pre-condition and m is a monitor representing ϕ
d members are given to Monitor m to update
regular expression. The transition set Act
the state of the monitor.
3.2.4

Verification

To ensure that the user’s behavior is compliant with the privacy policy, we need to
map the current state and the next state of user’s behavior model to the privacy
preserving behavior model.
Definition 5 ( Mapping from user behavior to privacy preserving dob be a surjective function, where M S(p, b
main) Let M S : K → K
t) = {(ρ, τ )|ρ =
d where:
AR(p), τ = AT (e
t)} and M T : Act → Act
M T (a, p, t) = {(ρ, τ )|ρ ∈ AR(p) ∧ τ ∈ AT (t)} if a = sh
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In the case that there is no mapping for the next state in the PPM, the communication action that triggered that transition will be reported to the user as disclosing.
Definition 6 ( Valid user behavior) Let user behavior system be at state k that
maps to b
k in the privacy preserving behavior model and the action (sh, p, t) happens.
If M S(p, t) exists, and the environmental variables satisfy ψ and m(M T (a, p, t)) is
in the final state then the communication action Act is valid.
The goal of privacy rules is to prevent the user from entering into a privacy
violating states. After reporting a privacy-violating action the user can ignore it
and the framework allow the information sharing to happen. All this communication
happens through the user interface of the framework. The next section provides
implementation details of the framework’s components.

3.3

Negotiation Protocols in Case of Invalid Behavior

This framework reports the violating actions to the user and allows the user to decide
whether he wants to proceed with the action or not. However, if the users decide
to continue with the action, they can compromise their privacy. As a solution,
the proposed framework creates a decision model for invalid actions that enables
the user to share the information without compromising the privacy. To create the
decision model we define the information sharing as a game form Γ(N, (Σi )i∈N ) where
N = {1, · · · , n} is a finite number of recipient agents and Σi is a set privacy decisions
that they can play [11]. We can compute ui for each strategy to show the utility of
each player after information sharing. The utility function u shows how satisfied the
users is with the communication action. The utility function defined in this paper
depends on four parameters that according to recent literature are contributing factors
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to the users privacy decisions [37, 60, 61]. The first parameter is the privacy policies.
The privacy policies dictate the amount of the information that the user is willing
to share with the other agents which brings us to the second and third parameters
the “information sensitivity” and “trust”. For each information attribute the user
can assign a sensitivity value. Also, for each recipient agent a trust value is assigned.
These three parameters capture the nature of access permission; However, recent
studies [34,37] show that there is another contributing factor known as “reward” that
makes privacy decisions more than an access control mechanism. The following section
describes each one these parameters in detail and then creates a utility function upon
them.
The u < 0 is an indication of privacy violating action due to lack of an access
permission and u = 0 is an special case that the access permission exists but the
privacy conditions are not satisfied. In such cases when the u ≤ 0 and the user
also requires a result from the service then there are two options available. The first
option is to ignore the privacy norms and share the information. Although convenient,
ignoring the privacy norms can have serious consequences. The second option is to use
different privacy mechanisms based on the parameters of the utility function. These
mechanisms allow the users to share information without jeopardising their privacy.

3.3.1

Information Sensitivity

The users assign different values to different information attributes. Although, these
value assignments for users do not have a metric and they are subjective, when
the information attribute value is transformed into a measurable metric for example
expressing the values in dollar amount, users become more privacy cautious [51,
61]. Since privacy preferences vary from person to person, the relative sensitivity of
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information attributes is also different for different users. For the purposes of this
research, we assume that these values are learned through some mechanism from the
user behaviour and are available to our decision model.
We define the information sensitivity s for each information attribute that is not
a combined attribute. Then, for each combined attribute we sum-up the sensitivity
of its children and add a sensitivity of s0 to it. This way an information attribute
with more children is considered more sensitive since it is more revealing.
Information sensitivity s = (pr, f d) consists of parameters pr as information
attributes permanency and f d as the frequency of information sharing to the diversity
of the recipients. A more permanent information attribute has greater sensitivity
compared to the less permanent attributes. For example, the user’s birthday is a
permanent information attribute, however, the current GPS values of the user’s device
are less permanent. Therefore, we define pr as the permanency factor of information
attribute t. The permanency factor for a combined information attribute equals to
the permanency factor of its child with the greatest permanency factor.
Another good indicator of information sensitivity is the frequency that an information attribute is shared [51]. The information attributes that are shared more
frequently can be considered as less sensitive. However, the frequency alone is not
reliable enough. In order to have a better sense of how sensitive information is to the
user, we need to look at the ratio of frequency to the recipient diversity. This way, if a
user is sharing an information attribute frequently with a large number of recipients,
he is considering this information attribute less sensitive compared to an information
attribute that is shared frequently with only a few. For example, the users that
have a habit of adding location tags to their posts on social media can be considered
as users that assign a low sensitivity value to their current location. Although the

30
frequency to recipient diversity ratio can be used to separate the dependency between
the information sensitivity and trust parameters, it is not sufficient for expressing the
user relationship with the recipients. Hence, we need to define trust as a separate
factor.

3.3.2

Trust

Studies show that trust and information sensitivity have a direct relationship with
each other [34,60]. Users tend to share more sensitive information with the recipients
that are more trusted. We define the amount of trustworthiness of a recipient with
the variable tr ∈ [0, 1] where 1 represents total trust in the recipient and 0 indicates
an untrustworthy recipient. Trust is computed as a function of information sensitivity
s, frequency f , and duration d of the sharing. We assign trust values to the recipient
agents and based on the agents trust-score, agents are clustered into different trust
roles. Therefore, a role that is more specialized has a higher score compared to its
child roles. In this setting, the roles are the boundaries of trust in addition to their
societal semantics. Thus, if an agent belongs to a specific role but the trust score is
not in the range of the roles trust score then the agent has to be moved to a role that
matches its trust-score. This way, we can capture the dynamic relationship between
the user and the recipient agents as their relationship gets stronger or fades away.
The formal definition of trust is as follows:

ezi
tr(zi ) = P zj
je
where zi is the sum of s, f, d of each communication action with the agent pi
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3.3.3

Reward

The reward is a quantifier on how rewarding the information sharing is to the user.
A simple method of computing the reward is subtracting the profit gained by information sharing from the cost of disclosure. The literature that exists in this area
considers two categories of rewards, the monetary reward, and the none monetary
reward. Also, the literature categorizes reward as with and without incentive. An
example of information sharing with monetary reward can be a mobile application
that offers the users an ad-free application only if the user shares the current location
with the application. Also, an example of a non-momentary reward Can be a Facebook account that collects users data instead of providing free services that connect
users on the application platform. Although it might seem that Facebook is providing
free services to the users, they are actually paying Facebook by sharing their data
that is used for the targeted advertisements to the account holders. The reward of
information sharing is not always getting a service, it can also be by making a complex
process more convenient. Computing the amount of reward for each communication
action is a hard task; however, for the purposes of this research, we are assuming
that there is a mechanism that can be used to return the reward of a communication
action.

3.3.4

Privacy Game

We are assuming that each privacy game has one player who is the user and the other
player is the information recipient. The recipient of the information can be a service,
another human or an application. The users goal is to keep their information as
private as they can and the opponent player goal is to get most information possible.
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We can categorize the opponent players based on their game strategies into different
groups. The rest of this section will describe the different possible player.

Third Party Services Strategies
Take it or leave it: These are the players that they only have one game strategy.
Most services and applications fall into this category. The “take it or leave it” players
only provide services to the user if the user provides them with all the information
they need. Therefore, if the information request from these services be against the
users’ policies the utility function of the users u(s, t, r) < 0 for all the strategies and
negotiation is not possible with this type of players.

Greedy Players:

The greedy players are the developed version of “Take It or

Leave It” players. They have a minimum requirements for information sharing but
they always ask for more than the minimum they need and they don’t reveal that
providing the rest of the information is optional. However, when the user denies them
the optional information they still provide services. The applications that request
access permissions but still provide complete or partial services when the permission
access is denied are greedy players. The Greedy players number of strategies is based
on the number of extra information they need.
Let Sg = {s0 , · · · , sk } be all the strategies that a greedy player has. The sk being
the first move of the greedy player where it asks for all the information(the minimum
requirement plus the extra ones) and s0 be the strategy that it only asks for the
required information. Therefore, it is possible to negotiate with them.
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Luring Players: The Luring players are the players that provide an additional
reward for sharing information with them. They can be considered as greedy players
but they try to increase the users utility function by providing rewards for each extra
information they want. An example of luring players are the applications that remove
the advertisements if the user shares his or her location with them.

3.3.5

User’s Game Strategy

For each privacy game, we assume that vector V ecp =< t0 , · · · , tk > is all the
information attributes that opponent agent p requires to perform the service. Also,
we assume that the user is unaware of the p playing strategy. However, the user
knows whether the information sharing is rewarding or not. The users wins the game
when they get the service they want. The game ends either by winning or running
out of strategies. The user starts the game with strategy

s0 = {(sh, p, t)|∃n = (ρ0 , τ 0 , ψ, ϕ)s.t.ρ0 = AR(p) ∧ τ 0 = AT (t)}

which is only sharing the information attributes with p that are allowed by privacy
norms. If the user does not win with s0 the system sorts elements of V ecp = V ecp −s0
in ascending order based on the value of

Inf ormation Sensitivity
.
Reward

Moreover, if the com-

munication action is not rewarding the vector is sorted by the information sensitivity
alone. Then we create strategy si = si−1 ∪ vi where vi ∈ V ecp until the game ends.
The sharing mechanism for vi is available in Table 3.2 where S, T, R are information
sensitivity, trust and reward respectively. Also, H, M, L indicate high, medium and
low vales and +, − describe whether the communication action is rewarding or not.
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Table 3.2: Sharing mechanism for violating information types
(S,T,R) Mechanism
(H,H,+) Control Loop
(H,L,+) Secure Computation
(H,M,+) Obfuscation
(H,H,-)
Control Loop
(H,L,-)
Secure Computation
(H,M,-)
Obfuscation
(L,H,+) Control Loop
(L,L,+)
Control Loop
(L,M,+) Control Loop
(L,H,-)
Control Loop
(L,L,-)
Control Loop
(L,M,-)
Control Loop
(M,H,+) Control Loop
(M,L,+) Secure Computation
(M,M,+) Obfuscation
(M,H,-)
Control Loop
(M,L,-)
Secure Computation
(M,M,-) Obfuscation
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CHAPTER 4

IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION

4.1

Implementation

As a proof of the concept, we prototyped the proposed framework in the Java programming language 1 . Figure 4.1 depicts a diagram of the implementation’s architecture.
The proposed framework is modularized into three layers:
• User interface layer which takes the user’s intentions in a structured format.
• Translation layer which translates the frameworks from UI to privacy norms
and formal notation.
• Verification layer that evaluates norms consistency and compliance of the information sharing action with privacy norms.
In the following sections describe the implementation details of each of the components in each layer.
4.1.1

User Interface Layer

The user interface (UI) layer facilitates interactions between the user and the proposed
framework. Through the UI the user can add and view the existing privacy norms
1

https://github.com/wxyzabc/UserCentricPrivacy
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Figure 4.1: The architecture of user-centric privacy framework. The blue components
show the libraries and technologies used in the proposed framework.

and get privacy violation reports. The UI is designed to conceal the complexity of the
underlying formalism and verification from the user. The UI hides the complexities
by allowing the users to express their privacy intentions as a structured input. Using
the UI the user can select the role and attribute type from a drop-down list. To create
the environmental conditions, the user can provide arbitrary inputs for environmental
variables or choose between predefined conditions e.g., daytime, nighttime, weekends.
Also, the user can specify the desired information sequence in the form of precedence
or repetition templates like “X happens after Y” or “X happens k times”. These
templates will be translated to sequencing conditions. The UI was created with
JavaFX framework and the Figure 4.2 depicts UI of the framework.
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Figure 4.2: The norm creation UI.

4.1.2

Translation Layer

The translation layer receives the structured input from the UI and translates it into
formal notation. The formal notations and maps described in the methodology section
can be implemented as tables in a database. The norm are stored in the norms table
where the table attributes are the role, attribute type, the environmental conditions,
and the DFA state of the sequencing conditions. The primary key of the norms table
is the pair of (ρ, τ ). The system queries the database to retrieve the norms in order
to either verify an action or check the consistency of a new norm. In this framework,
MariaDB version 10.2 was used as the database. To evaluate each action with the
attribute t and the agent p, norms that have roles where ρ = AR(p) and attribute
type τ = AT (t) are retrieved from the norm table and sent to the verification layer.
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4.1.3

Verification Layer

This layer verifies the information sharing actions compliance with the privacy norms
and the consistency of a new norm with existing norms. If an information sharing
action violates the privacy norms or a new norm causes inconsistency, then this layer
sends a violation report to the UI to inform the user. The user can ignore the
violation caused by the information sharing action and allow the information to be
shared. With an inconsistent norm, the user has to change the new norm so that it
will be consistent with other norms. The rest of this section describes the verification
method of information sharing actions and privacy norms in more detail.

Verification of Norms for Inconsistency
When a new norm is created, the framework checks the consistency of the new norm
with the existing norms. Based on the consistency constraints in section 3.2.2 the
framework first ensures that the new norm access permission does not exist in the
database. Then the new norm’s environmental conditions are checked for consistency.
The framework parses the string of the environmental conditions and translates them
to satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver formulas. Then the SMT solver proves
that the implication or equivalency relation holds and is always valid. Validation
assessment of formula f by SMT solvers is done by proving that ¬f is unsatisfiable,
hence f always evaluates to true. By proving that there is no combination of variables
that satisfy ¬f it can be concluded that f is a tautology. In a case that the solver finds
a solution to ¬f , the user is asked to change the inconsistent new norms. Further,
since efficiency is important in real-time systems, we need to assign a time limit for the
solver. If the solver times out or returns UNKNOWN the user will be notified. Finally,

39
if the new norm is consistent it will be added to the database. The implementation of
the proposed framework utilizes JavaSMT [28] with the Z3 solver version 4.3.2 [18] for
consistency checking over the environmental variables and “brics” automate library
version 1.12-1 [39] for sequencing conditions.

Verification of Actions for Violation
For each action (sh, p, t) , the framework finds the attribute type of t and the role
of p. Then the privacy norms tables are queried to find the norms with the access
permission (AR(p), AT (t)) as their primary keys. If the query returns no results, it
means that no norm allows sharing information t with agent p. However, If the query
returns results, it indicates that there exists a mapping from a state in UBM to a
state in the PPM. Then the framework checks for the satisfaction of the environmental
conditions and sequencing conditions before taking the transition to the mapped state.
Since the norm conditions are dynamic, they cannot be hard-coded in the verification engine. Therefore to check the environmental variables a mechanism is needed
to enable the verification engine to handle change in the conditions. Therefore,
the conditions are formed and evaluated at run-time based on the stored environmental constraints in the database. For the implementation of such a mechanism
that allows for dynamic manipulation and evaluation of conditions, the Expression
Languages (EL) can be used. EL receives an object and a logical expression as a
string and evaluates whether the object properties satisfy the expression or not. In
our implementation,the current snapshot of the environment is given to the EL as
the input object that has the environmental values and the EL expression string
is the environmental constraints of the retrieved privacy norms. This framework
employs Spring Expression Language (SpEL) [1] as the EL library. EL only checks
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for the satisfaction of the environmental conditions and if they are not satisfied
then the transition guard is not satisfied. Therefore, the action violates the privacy
model. However, if the environmental conditions are satisfied then we check for the
satisfaction of sequencing conditions.
Sequencing conditions are implemented as run-time monitors from the regular expressions stored in the database. A run-time monitor is a deterministic finite automaton
(DFA) that is created based on a regular expression. The DFA representing the
sequencing condition has a pointer to its current state and changes its state with the
occurrence of information sharing actions. If the new state in the DFA monitor is
not a final state, then the action is not valid, and the system reports the violation to
the user. Different libraries exist for creating run-time monitors such as AspectJ, but
the monitors created by them are static. Therefore, a change in one of the regular
expressions demands a reset in all the monitors. In the proposed framework the
regular expressions are dynamic, and changing a regular expression only causes a
reset in the corresponding DFA. Another method for implementing the sequencing
conditions is to store a history of information sharing actions; however, with each
information sharing action, the history will grow, and to potentially infinite size.
With the run-time monitors, the number of the DFAs are constant and equal to the
number of the norms with sequencing conditions. Algorithm 4 shows the general steps
taken to implement the information sharing action verification process. Considering
the implementation bellow, in the next section we discuss the performance evaluation
of the proposed framework.
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Algorithm 4: Action verification algorithm.
1 Input: ISA (An information sharing action)
2 Output:Boolean value indicating the verification result.
3 norms=[]
4 recipientGroups=ISA.recipient.getGroups()
5 for g in recipientGroups do
6
norms.append(getnorms(ISA.InformationType, g))
7 if (norms.size> 0) then
8
for j in norms do
9
if !(j.evalEnvironmentalCondition (ISA.environment)) then
10
return false
11
else
12
if !(j.evalSequencingCondition(ISA)) then
13
return false
14
return true
15 return false

4.2

Performance Evaluation

The proposed framework is designed for user-centric applications; therefore, it should
have acceptable performance on smart devices such as smart-phones, internet of things
devices and etc. The main challenge in this area is that usually, these devices have
low memory and computational power. Since detection of privacy violations in such
applications is supposed to be real-time, a framework with a substantial performance
overhead cannot deliver the desired results. Therefore, our implementation was tested
for performance evaluation on a Raspberry Pi model B with 700 MHz CPU, 512 MB
RAM and running Raspbian 4.9 operating system, as well as a PC with 3.0 GHz
AMD Phenom II X4 945 processor, with 8 GB of memory and Windows 7 operating
system. The privacy policy created for this test contained 81 privacy norms over
12 attribute types and 16 roles which 8 of them have nonempty intersections with
groups.
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Table 4.1 shows the results of the information sharing action verification performance evaluation. The number in each column indicates the average verification
response time for each part of the privacy norm. The average was computed for 20
information sharing actions which half were privacy violating actions and the other
half were non-violating actions. The performance evaluation was over 2 environmental
variables time and day and the allowed sequencing conditions were “a after b” and
“a occurred k times”. Also, notice that the performance of the action verification
depends on the performance of the underlying database software and expression
language library. In the implementation of our framework, we used MariaDB version
10.2 database and SpEL 3.1.0 as the EL library.
Table 4.1: Action verification performance evaluation results. The columns show
the response time for Access Permission (AP), Environmental Conditions (EC),
Sequencing Conditions (SC) and All shows the average verification time for a norm
that have all the elements.

Machine
PC
Pi B

Action Verification
AP
EC
SC
1.5 ms 0.5 ms 3.5 ms
39 ms
6 ms 540 ms

The average time for the consistency check performance evaluation on the PC
was 39 ms and for the Raspberry Pi model B was 849 ms. Also, notice that the
performance of this consistency checking depends on the performance of the underlying solver and the domain size of the environmental variables (since the solvers
are faster when the search domain is smaller). For example, in our implementation,
the norms time conditions were specified as (hours×100+minutes) and time intervals
could be subsets of each other. Table 4.2 shows the SMT-solver performance for
constraints with 5,10,20,50,100, and 500 environmental variables. The over-head of
bric library for language sunset and equivalency is around 7ms on average. However,
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the projection algorithm is the bottle neck since it computes the permutation of the
information types that are needed for substitution in the regular expression. Due to
this drawback the framework limits the number of children for each attribute to 5
children.
Table 4.2: Performance of consistency checking for Environmental Variables
Number of Variables 5 10 20 50 100 500
Implication time (ms)
26 28 30 40 35
66
Equivalency time (ms)
32 34 35 46 41
67
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Administrating and managing users’ privacy is a major challenge in the digital
age. Privacy has a different meaning to different users depending on their personality,
age, social status, cultural background, and many other factors. Furthermore, users’
privacy policies are dynamic in nature and evolve to reflect the changes in users’
relationships and present situations. However, current privacy management systems
cannot address these privacy needs adequately since they are not designed based on
the users’ privacy perspective. This issue in privacy management systems decreases
their usability among everyday users and puts unaware users at risk of information
disclosure. The proposed framework provides a privacy formalism and verification
engine to specify and model privacy from the user’s perspective. Moreover, as a
proof of concept, a framework was implemented and tested based on the described
formalism. In the proposed model, the contextual integrity theory has been customized to address the privacy needs of individual users. Further, the user-centric
privacy framework is meant to be used in user devices, which compared to servers and
general purpose computers that are targeted in the existing work have lower memory
and computational power. These limitations justify the use of regular expressions
instead of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) in our paper since empirical evidence [10]
shows that the evaluation of the regular expressions has significantly less overhead
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compared to LTL. Furthermore, our framework similar to

[7] allows for adding

environmental conditions to the privacy norms which makes the policy creation more
accurate. In addition, for privacy enforcement and verification our framework utilizes
a two layered mapping approach from a transition system to a guarded transition
system which has less overhead compared to model checking techniques. Further,
the proposed framework allows suggested privacy decisions based on information
sensitivity, trust and reward. There are multiple privacy negotiation mechanisms
that utilize obfuscation and secure computation, without compromising their privacy.
However, these methods are not always applicable to all information types.
Since this work is our first step toward a formal dynamic user-centric privacy
model which is creating a formal model of privacy policy, the burden of providing
input for the rule creation process is on the user. In our future work, the current
user interface will be removed, and rule inputs will be created automatically utilizing
text analysis, speech recognition and AI algorithms that can infer a user’s privacy
policy based on the users relationships and information sharing behavior. Also, at this
point of our work the framework assumes that the values for computing information
sensitivity, trust and reward is given. Another assumption of our framework is that all
the environmental variables have deterministic values for the evaluation and cannot
handle non-deterministic situations. In our future works we intend to address the
above limitations by expanding the logic to overcome non-deterministic situations,
increase the number of users, and add new rule formulas to our language.
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